Fiscal Policy and Management in East Asia, NBER-EASE, Volume 16 by Cielito F. Habito
This PDF is a selection from a published volume from the
National Bureau of Economic Research
Volume Title: Fiscal Policy and Management in East Asia,
NBER-EASE, Volume 16
Volume Author/Editor: Takatoshi Ito and Andrew K. Rose,
editors
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 978-0-226-38681-2
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/ito_07-1
Conference Date: June 23-25, 2005
Publication Date: October 2007
Title: Comment on "Will China Eat Our Lunch or Take Us
to Dinner? Simulating the Transition Paths of the United
States, European Union, Japan, and China"
Author: Cielito F. Habito
URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c0379Reference
Auerbach, A. J., R. Hagemann, L. J. Kotlikoﬀ, and G. Nicoletti. 1989. The eco-
nomics of aging population: The case of four OECD countries. OECD Economic
Studies 12:97–130.
Comment Cielito F. Habito
In its earlier version submitted to the EASE 16 conference for review 
(“The Developed World’s Demographic Transition—The Roles of Capital
Flows, Immigration, and Policy”), the study analyzed the demographic
transitions occurring in the United States, the European Union, and Japan
(i.e., the developed world) and their welfare implications, via impacts on 
the pension system and on ﬁscal management. Using an overlapping-
generations model that incorporates most of the state-of-the-art features
employed in such demographic models (more on this follows), simulations
yielded alarming results: (a) in a do-nothing scenario, payroll taxes would
have to at least double to support beneﬁts committed to the elderly; (b)
macroeconomic feedback eﬀects of aging populations lead to a signiﬁcant
capital shortage that dramatically lowers real wages (by 19 percent) and
raises real interest rates (by over 400 basis points); and (c) even substantial
immigration would do little to mitigate the ﬁscal squeeze. One way out that
would exact short-term pain (i.e., welfare losses for current generations in-
cluding the elderly) is to close down at the margin existing government pen-
sion systems and use consumption taxes to pay oﬀ their accrued liabilities.
This would raise the welfare of future generations enormously, with those
in Europe and Japan beneﬁting the most.
That analysis of course ignored the fact that there is much else in the
world beyond the United States, Europe, and Japan. The addition of high-
saving China into the picture dramatically changes the results, with China
emerging as the savior that bails out the developed world from impending
major ﬁscal troubles and real wage declines. Even if China’s saving rate
eventually falls to the U.S. levels, it still manages to spare the developed
world from eventual real wage declines, and instead permits substantial
real wage increases. All the more if one further considers India and South-
east Asia, the other dynamic and high-saving economies in Asia. In eﬀect,
the developed world will be saved from potentially debilitating diﬃculties
by the developing world, with their high saving rates and lower dependency
ratios.
The study is of great interest to those in East Asia for at least three rea-
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of the Ateneo Center for Economic Research and Development.sons. First, the ﬁscal situations in the United States, the European Union,
and Japan have profound implications on East Asian economies, given the
strong trade and investment linkages between the region (outside of Japan)
and these three large economies. Macroeconomic management in devel-
oping East Asian economies is currently heavily conditioned by the record
deﬁcits (external and ﬁscal) being incurred by the United States, for ex-
ample. Second, for labor-surplus economies like the Philippines, the study
gives reason not to expect any dramatic shifts in immigration policy in the
developed world, as there seems to be little incentive for them to loosen up
on immigration based on a long-run economic-stability argument. Third,
the study provides a useful framework and approach for analyzing the fu-
ture of pension systems in East Asia, diﬀerent demographics notwith-
standing.
In the Philippines, in particular, it is hard to identify with the study as the
demographics are dramatically diﬀerent, and indeed in the opposite situa-
tion of having a much larger younger population due to traditionally high
population growth rates. Demographics are in fact among the least of its
concerns in plotting the future of its pension system. The country’s pen-
sion problems trace more to issues on the proper investment of retirement
funds, and politicization of the management of beneﬁts and contributions.
In the developed-country case, the analysis leads to an important policy
implication: government needs to ease itself out of running public pension
systems and move toward privatizing them. This implication is largely
conditioned by the baby boom–baby bust phenomenon undergone by the
three major developed economies modeled. For the Philippines and many
developing countries with diﬀerent demographics, the policy implication
for pension privatization does not necessarily have as compelling an ap-
peal as it would have in the developed countries. Temporary labor migra-
tion—an important feature in the labor markets of the Philippines and
other similarly situated countries—also presents unique questions on im-
plications for pension policy.
The various features incorporated into the life-cycle model with over-
lapping generations make the model employed in the study truly state of
the art. An important improvement has been the inclusion of government
investment in the formulation, the omission of which in the earlier version
(i.e., treating government purchases as government consumption) ap-
peared to unduly magnify the negative eﬀects of the demographic trends
on real wages and human welfare. Admittedly, the complexity of the sys-
tem being modeled necessitates a good deal of simplifying assumptions
(e.g., immigrants have the same asset endowments and preferences as na-
tive counterparts; people die between ages 68 and 90).
It is not clear from the paper whether adequate sensitivity analyses have
been undertaken on some of the key assumptions and parameters used in
building the analysis, but this would be an important test on the robustness
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made by the inclusion of government investment and the addition of China
appears to be an indication of strong sensitivity of simulation results to
model parameters and features. It is likewise not clear whether the basic
life-cycle assumptions are uniform for the United States, Europe, Japan,
and China. The diﬀerences explicitly modeled are on demographic vari-
ables and immigration rates, but cultural diﬀerences certainly lead to
diﬀerences in life-cycle decisions (e.g., bequest motives, income depend-
ence on parents).
The incorporation of uncertainty in speciﬁc key elements of the model,
particularly lifespan uncertainty, is useful to better model mortality and
bequest behavior using available probabilistic information—and it adds
better realism to the model. The inclusion of capital adjustment costs is
also a good realistic element.
The modeling framework suﬀers from the same constraint suﬀered by
CGE models (i.e., validation is only possible for the benchmark data set).
Because of this, one cannot really validate the dynamic outcomes of the
model, making sensitivity analysis all the more important.
Still, the model is the most comprehensive so far in capturing the vari-
ous elements in the life-cycle/overlapping-generations system. The inter-
esting extension would be the inclusion of the remaining major economic
regions in the world not yet captured so far in the analysis.
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